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Zawahiri Letter to Zarqawi
     Discusses War of Perceptions

By Roberto Carmack

The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence has released a letter that many American experts believe was written by a top Al Qaeda official and intended for the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. U.S. forces in Iraq had recently acquired the communiqué, which the U.S. government released to the public Oct. 11.

Attributed to Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is widely believed to be the second most senior Al Qaeda commander after Osama Bin Laden, the July letter was intended for an affiliated mujahideen, or Muslim holy warrior, in Iraq. The Bush administration and most U.S. media outlets have indicated their strong belief that the intended recipient was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq and the likely orchestrator of dozens of terrorist operations in that country within the past two years.

While both Al Qaeda and the Middle East-based Al Jazeera news network claim that the letter is a fabrication, an overwhelming majority of experts in the U.S. have stated that it is genuine. According to the Director of National Intelligence website, “the U.S. Government has the highest confidence in the letter’s authenticity.”

The core of the letter opens by placing the Iraqi war within the context of an epic global battle between Islam and its enemies. The author states that Islam’s final victory will not occur until “a Muslim state is established in the manner of the Prophet in the heart of the Muslim world,” an entity he later refers to as an “amirate” or “caliphate.” According to the author, however, victory in Iraq must precede any such endeavor. In order to facilitate this goal, the author begins providing advice to the guerrilla insurgent concerning the overall strategy that the Jihadists are employing in Iraq. The letter appears to suggest that the Iraqi guerrilla, not the Al Qaeda leadership in South Asia, will have the final say over the strategy.

The author’s advice centers on the relationship between the Jihadist movement and the Iraqi population as a whole: “In the absence of this popular support, the Islamic mujahideen movement would be crushed in the shadows.” In order to gain and maintain this support, the author admonishes the guerrilla not to perpetrate acts “that the masses do not understand or approve [of].” He advises the guerrilla to include as diverse an assortment of Iraqi social groups as possible in the insurgency, which could then evolve into “an organization that represents all honorable people and the loyal folks of Iraq.” According to the author, this democratization of the movement would lay the groundwork for a stable fundamentalist government that would assume power after the ouster of the U.S.

The communiqué continues by enjoining the letter’s recipient to diminish his concern over Islamic sectarianism in Iraq. He writes: “Even if there is some heresy or fault in [the Islamic population] that is not blasphemous - we must find a means to include them and benefit from their energy.” The author appears to consider a Muslim’s commitment to Jihad more important than his or her affiliation with any particular Sunni sect. He does not appear to feel similarly about Shiite Muslims, however. In his letter, the author lampoons Iraq’s Shiites for their “cooperation with the Americans in… the overthrow of Saddam [Hussein] and the occupation of Iraq,” as well as for ascribing to a school of religion based on “excess and falsehood.” The letter also implies at several points that the author does not even consider the Shiites to be Muslims at all. Still, the author questions the wisdom of terrorist assaults on Shiite mosques and civilians. He states that most Iraqi citizens probably do not understand the reasons for these attacks, and their support for the Iraqi insurgency might eventually decrease because of them.

The author’s final point of advice concerns the many “scenes of slaughter” that Iraq has witnessed since 2003. Referring to the execution of hostages, the author states that he sees the utility of “sowing terror in the hearts of the crusaders and their helpers” but nevertheless strongly opposes these acts because they may alienate moderate Muslims. The letter concludes with the supposition that Al Qaeda is engaged in war of duality, one that is taking place both on the battlefield and in the media. By slaughtering hostages, the author says he fears that the Iraqi mujahidden will lose this media war of perception.

The author states that his primary purpose for writing this letter was to ensure that the fundamentalist movement in Iraq would not “let his eyes lose sight of the target” - that is, the “hearts and minds” of Iraq’s Sunnis. And so the author appears to be telling the guerrilla to moderate his tactics and lessen the extreme violence that has until recent months permeated his campaign. Whether this effort will have any discernable effect remains to be seen.